Welfare states and social cohesion in Europe: does social service quality matter? by Andrews, Rhys William & Jilke, Sebastian
This is an Open Access document downloaded from ORCA, Cardiff University's institutional
repository: http://orca.cf.ac.uk/85391/
This is the author’s version of a work that was submitted to / accepted for publication.
Citation for final published version:
Andrews, Rhys William and Jilke, Sebastian 2016. Welfare states and social cohesion in Europe:
does social service quality matter? Journal of Social Policy 45 (01) , pp. 119-140.
10.1017/S0047279415000513 file 
Publishers page: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0047279415000513
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0047279415000513>
Please note: 
Changes made as a result of publishing processes such as copy-editing, formatting and page
numbers may not be reflected in this version. For the definitive version of this publication, please
refer to the published source. You are advised to consult the publisher’s version if you wish to cite
this paper.
This version is being made available in accordance with publisher policies. See 
http://orca.cf.ac.uk/policies.html for usage policies. Copyright and moral rights for publications
made available in ORCA are retained by the copyright holders.
1 
 
Welfare states and social cohesion in Europe: Does social service quality 
matter? 
Rhys Andrews, Cardiff Business School, AndrewsR4@cardiff.ac.uk 
Sebastian Jilke, Rutgers University 
 
In this article, the authors evaluate whether the provision of good quality social services has 
the potential to create social cohesion. In addition to examining the relationship between 
social services and social cohesion, the authors expand institutional theories of social capital 
by investigating whether this potential for building social solidarity may be resilient to the 
corrosive effects of economic strain. Multilevel analyses of variations in the perceptions of 
social cohesion amongst Europeans were conducted for 27 member countries of the EU using 
the Eurobarometer 74.1 on poverty and social exclusion from 2010. The results suggest that 
individuals receiving better quality social service provision perceived higher levels of social 
cohesion within the country in which they live. By contrast, individuals living in households 
experiencing economic strain perceive lower levels of cohesion. Further analysis revealed 
that the experience of economic strain does not weaken the positive relationship between 
social services quality and perceptions of cohesion.  
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Introduction 
The welfare state has long been regarded as playing a unique and critical role in supporting 
social solidarity within the countries of Europe (Taylor-Gooby, 2005). However, in recent 
years, commitment to, and support for, the welfare state within and across European countries 
has come under increasing pressure. (Hemerijck, 2013). Yet, the idea that the welfare state is 
central to social cohesion in European societies remains a powerful and influential one. 
Institutional theories of social capital, in particular, highlight how social services and welfare 
provision contribute to the development of generalized trust between citizens (Freitag and 
Buhlmann, 2009; Rothstein and Stolle, 2008), and European debates about social cohesion 
continue to emphasize that access to public services is a key policy aim (Vandenbroucke, 
Hemerijck and Palier, 2011). Although the global financial crisis, and its fallout, have 
arguably placed more pressure on the cohesiveness of European societies than at any time in 
the post-war period (European Commission 2011), the welfare state is still thought to be 
serving as a crucial bulwark against the centrifugal tendencies of economic hardship 
(Marchal, Marx and van Mechelen, 2014). The relationship between the quality of the social 
services received by citizens and their perceptions of social cohesion within European 
countries is therefore a timely and pertinent subject for empirical investigation.  
Social cohesion is a concept that is often mobilized by policy-makers to capture a kind 
of idealized togetherness within society, especially in response to perceived social crises 
(Bernard 1999). Yet, despite its frequent politicization, the concept of social cohesion has 
long been deployed by social scientists as a means for investigating the capacity of a 
community to reproduce itself in the long-run (e.g. Durkheim, 1984; Tönnies, 1955). The 
growing literature on the definition and measurement of social cohesion (e.g. Chan, To and 
Chan 2006; Dragalov et al., 2013) suggests there are two broad approaches to understanding 
social cohesion. The first emphasises the shared norms and values that bind communities 
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together, while the second stresses the actual quality of social relationships (Delhey 2007). In 
this paper, we adopt a relational approach to the issue as this emphasises the inter-group 
relations, which are the focus of current debates about the cohesiveness of European 
societies. In doing so, we concentrate on an aspect of social cohesion that has received only 
limited attention to date: the perceived degree of tension between different social groups.  
As academic and policy debates about the future of the welfare state have grown in 
salience, so too has interest in what shapes Europeans’ perceptions of how well different 
social groups get along (e.g. Andrews, Jilke and Van de Walle, 2014; Green, Janmaat and 
Cheng, 2011; Whelan and Maitre, 2005). Nevertheless, comparatively little is still known 
about the relationship between the performance of the welfare state and citizens’ perceptions 
of social cohesion. In particular, although the relationship between social services quality and 
social cohesion has been studied within single countries using measures of generalized trust 
(e.g. Kumlin and Rothstein, 2005), to our knowledge there has been no research evaluating 
the connection between social services quality and inter-group relations either within or 
across countries. Evidence on this relationship and its boundary conditions can tell one much 
about the prospects for social cohesion in Europe.  
Since one of the major rationales for the state-led provision of social services is their 
propensity for building social solidarity, it seems logical to suppose that citizens who receive 
better quality social services will also perceive group relations to be more harmonious. 
Nevertheless, it is still conceivable that this positive performance pay-off may be contingent 
upon the economic strain individuals are experiencing. Individuals experiencing economic 
hardship tend to make unfavourable comparisons between their own lot and that of outgroups 
(Elster, 1995). This, in turn, may problematize the propensity of the welfare state to impart a 
sentiment of everyone “being in it together” when times are tough. Are individuals receiving 
better quality social services more likely to perceive positive inter-group relations? Do 
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individuals experiencing economic strain perceive social cohesion to be weaker? Does the 
experience of strain undermine the positive effect of high-quality social services on inter-
group relations? To answer these questions, this study draws on the Eurobarometer 74.1 on 
poverty and social exclusion conducted in 2010, which was answered by respondents from 27 
member countries of the EU. Using multilevel modelling techniques, we explore the 
independent and combined effects of social services quality and economic strain on 
respondents’ perceptions of the relations between the major social groupings within their 
country.  
The paper begins by discussing institutional theories of social capital and applying 
them to the case of inter-group relations. Next, hypotheses on the relationships between 
social services quality, economic strain and perceptions of social cohesion are developed. 
Thereafter, the data and methods for our analysis are described, before the results of our 
statistical modelling are presented. The paper concludes with a discussion of the theoretical 
and practical implications of the findings. 
 
Theoretical framework and prior studies 
Institutional theories of social capital suggest that the quality of public institutions leaves an 
indelible mark on individuals’ attitudes, beliefs and actions (Rothstein and Stolle, 2008). In 
particular, when public institutions are perceived to be functioning effectively as a ‘fair rule-
setter or rule-imposer’ individuals may be more likely to trust others within society because 
the incentive for opportunistic behaviour is much weaker (and vice versa) (Cook, Hardin and 
Levi, 2005). Street-level institutions play an especially critical role in building confidence in 
the political system, because they adhere to principles of impartiality, efficiency and fairness 
(Rothstein and Stolle, 2008). When these street-level institutions perform well, citizens are 
likely to believe institutions will be capable of resolving disagreements between different 
5 
 
groups that would otherwise create difficult social tensions. Thus, the management and 
quality of public services potentially shapes individuals’ perceptions of social cohesion. The 
welfare state may be an especially important street-level institution in this respect, since the 
‘street-level bureaucrats’ who deliver social services shape what it means to be a citizen 
through the role they play in dealing with clients (Blaxland, 2013). 
Because faith in street-level institutions induces trustworthy behaviour (Irwin, 2009), 
it can also undergird citizens’ confidence that social and political tensions can be successfully 
resolved. As such, the quality of social services might be thought prima facie to be a critical 
influence on the propensity for citizens to trust one another and to believe that inter-group 
tensions are surmountable. However, comparatively little research has analysed the potential 
effects of social services quality on citizens’ attitudes towards each other and about the state 
of social relations within their country.  Numerous comparative studies have now examined 
the connections between different welfare state regimes and generalized trust, invariably 
concluding Scandinavian countries are blessed with higher levels of trust and other aspects of 
social capital (e.g. Pichler and Wallace, 2007; van Oorschot and Arts, 2005). Researchers 
have also evaluated the relationship between levels of welfare spending and social trust, 
uncovering a mixed pattern of associations depending on the measure of social capital (van 
Oorschot and Arts, 2005; Gelissen, van Oorschot and Finsveen, 2012). One of the reasons for 
these inconclusive findings may be that it is not welfare expenditure that matters, but the 
ways in which that resource is utilised. Lee (2013), for example, finds that spending on active 
labour market policies contributes to social trust, whereas spending on social security 
transfers has a deleterious effect. At the same time, the ways in which the welfare state treats 
citizens may be important. Rothstein and Uslaner’s (2005) cross-country research finds that 
universal welfare policies are associated with higher interpersonal trust than selective or 
needs-based ones; as do Kumlin and Rothstein (2005) in their study of local welfare 
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institutions in Sweden. All of which suggests that the quality of the welfare services that 
citizens receive may influence levels of social capital and cohesion. But what do we mean 
when we talk about the quality of social services? 
For the purposes of this study, we rely on citizen perceptions to evaluate service 
quality. Such measures can capture the actual experience of service users in a way that the 
artificial selection of “objective” service outputs (e.g. average time waited for a case to be 
processed, number of hours of care provided) simply cannot. At the same time, perceptual 
data may be the only comparable information available on the quality of social services 
across multiple countries (Missinne, Meuleman and Bracke, 2013). For these reasons, 
citizens’ perceptions of the quality of the services provided by the welfare state offer a unique 
perspective on the contribution that social services can make to social cohesion. Nevertheless, 
evidence on that contribution has been slow to emerge.   
Studies have analysed the connection between confidence in public institutions and 
interpersonal trust (e.g. Rothstein and Stolle, 2008), and there is work that has evaluated 
dissatisfaction with domestic public services and trust in the European Parliament (e.g. 
Kumlin, 2009). However, to date, little research has investigated the connection between 
satisfaction with social services and the cohesiveness of European societies. Kumlin and 
Rothstein (2005) illustrate how individuals’ perceptions of the receipt of services to which 
they were entitled contributed to higher levels of interpersonal trust. Likewise, the urban 
studies literature suggests that high quality public services can enhance residents’ satisfaction 
with the quality of life in their neighbourhood (see, for example, Parkes, Kearns and 
Atkinson, 2002). In a similar fashion, we anticipate prima facie that satisfaction with social 
services will be positively related to perceptions of social cohesion. Social service 
organizations play an especially important role in integrating excluded or marginalised 
groups within the policy process and social and economic life of a country (Marrow, 2009). 
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Interactions with social services represent a structured ‘space of association’ through which 
group needs can be addressed and inter-group dialogue can take place (Amin, 2002). 
Nonetheless, in spite of the potential for investment in the development of quality social 
services to result in a wider societal pay-off, it is also conceivable that the benefits of quality 
social services for social cohesion reach a point beyond which further marginal gains in inter-
group harmony are no longer realized – or, put differently, that services become “good 
enough” to underpin a cohesive society.  
Van Ryzin and Charbonneau (2010) illustrate how the use of public services can have 
an inverted u-shaped relationship with users’ actual satisfaction with those services, and it is 
possible that an analogous process occurs in the building of a cohesive society. Theories of 
customer expectation-disconfirmation suggest that as people’s expectations of service quality 
expand so too does the likelihood that they will be less satisfied with the quality of the 
services (James, 2009). From this perspective, it may be the case that the social pay-off from 
providing high-quality social services reaches an optimum point once a certain standard of 
service quality has been attained, beyond which no further gains in cohesion are realised. Or 
in other words, once the expectations of people regarding the quality of social services are 
met, further quality improvements make no additional contribution to the cohesiveness of 
society. On the basis of all these arguments about the role that social services play in 
generating cohesive societies, we therefore anticipate that: 
  
H1a: There is a positive relationship between social services quality and perceptions of social 
cohesion; 
H1b: The positive relationship between social services quality and perceptions of social 
cohesion will exhibit diminishing marginal returns. 
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In addition to the potential benefits of high-quality social services for social cohesion, 
it is important to consider possible detrimental influences on the inter-group relations within 
European societies. The economic circumstances of individuals, in particular, seems 
especially likely to influence social cohesion. That said, the amount of income people earn 
may be less important than their perceived experience of economic strain. Reference group 
theory highlights how the perception of relative economic deprivation may be as detrimental 
to social solidarity as actual income inequality (Runciman, 1966). Indeed, economic strain is 
not straightforwardly equivalent to a person‘s income. Instead, it is a concept that refers to 
how hard people are finding it to live on their current income (Whelan et al., 2001). In this 
respect, people’s subjective assessment of their economic circumstances may not even 
correlate with their actual income or standard of living. One good example of this, is the 
experience of the “squeezed middle” in recent years who may feel, rightly or wrongly, that 
they are experiencing as much if not more economic pressure than their working class 
neighbours (Scott and Pressman, 2011).  
According to reference group theory, individuals routinely compare their own social 
and economic circumstances with that of others. For people experiencing economic strain, 
this subjective comparison can create the same kinds of damaging psychological effects 
associated with the “objective” fact of being poor (Runciman, 1966). Mani and colleagues 
(2013) highlight how people who are economically hard-pressed experience reduced 
cognitive capacity, which, results in their believing that their difficulties prevent them from 
achieving a better standard of living. For Elster (1983), individuals experiencing strain may 
feel unable to attain the place within the social structure to which they aspire and become apt 
to feel ‘sour grapes’ when they see their compatriots doing better than themselves (see also 
Hedstrom, 2005). This can give rise to the perception that some individuals and groups are 
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gaining at the expense of others, which will potentially spur hostility and resentment towards 
outgroups (Hoggett, Wilkinson and Beedell, 2013).  
By prompting out-group hostility, the negative comparisons individuals make 
between their own circumstances and that of others, ultimately undermines the shared goals 
and values that underpin social cohesion (Merton, 1957). Where there is a mismatch between 
an individual’s economic aspirations and their actual ability to make ends meet, in particular, 
feelings of resentment towards outgroups may be more likely to arise, as people’s well-being 
is profoundly shaped by their place within the economic opportunity structure (Hagerty, 
1998). In addition to potentially suffering lower levels of life satisfaction and increased 
hostility towards outgroups, individuals experiencing economic strain, like those who live in 
poverty, may lack the willingness and capacity to actively participate in activities that can 
contribute to the cohesiveness of society. For example, economically stressed individuals 
may be less inclined to devote their time and energy to developing or maintaining the social 
networks that can subsume out-group hostility or to contribute to the kinds of civil 
associations that build connections between diverse social groups (Dieckhoff and Gash, 
2015). Given the potential for sour grapes to give rise to outgroup hostility and for the 
experience of economic strain to constrain civic participation, our second hypothesis is: 
 
H2: Economic strain is negatively related to perceptions of social cohesion. 
 
 In addition to having a direct negative connection with perceptions of social cohesion, 
economic strain is likely to influence the impact that other salient variables might have on 
people’s perceptions of tensions between different social groups. In particular, when their life 
situation leads them to compare themselves unfavourably to other reference groups, 
individuals may value the public goods that are provided to them less. The wider societal 
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benefits of high-quality welfare provision may therefore be adversely affected by the 
propensity for a person’s failure to achieve the standard of living to which they aspire to 
result in their feeling alienated from society or hostile towards other social groups (Hedstrom, 
2005). Individuals experiencing severe economic strain who are nonetheless satisfied with the 
social services that they receive, may still conceivably feel that the society in which they live 
has become one in which their own life aspirations and chances are not valued as highly as 
those of other social groups. For example, some, though not all, research on perceptions of 
welfare deservingness suggests that individuals in more difficult socio-economic 
circumstances or of lower socio-economic status apply more stringent criteria of 
conditionality to the distribution of welfare (Golding and Middleton, 1982; van Oorshot, 
2000; though c.f. van Oorschot, 2006).  
Although a positive experience of social citizenship might potentially buffer 
Europeans from some of the centrifugal effects of economic strain, it is possible that the 
potential for good social services to inspire a positive sense of common citizenship becomes 
damaged by the experience of economic inequality. Or, put differently, that the welfare state 
is simply unable to overcome the ‘sour grapes’ that individuals unable to attain the kind of 
life they desire feel when they look about them. Hence, our final hypothesis is that: 
 
H3: Economic strain weakens the positive relationship between good social services and 
social cohesion. 
 
Data and method 
To analyse citizens' perceptions of social services quality and social cohesion within their 
country, we draw upon Eurobarometer data. Eurobarometers are cross-national, large-N 
public opinion surveys that have been conducted twice a year on behalf of the European 
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Commission since 1973. Respondents are selected following a multi‐stage, random 
probability sampling procedure from the total population aged fifteen and above in each 
country, and then interviewed face-to-face at their homes. Eurobarometer questionnaires are 
carefully designed, translated and back‐translated to check for consistency of meaning and 
interpretation (see GESIS, 2013). For this study, we use Eurobarometer 74.1 on poverty and 
social exclusion, which was fielded across the EU-27 member countries between August and 
September 2010 (European Commission 2010). On average, 1,000 respondents were 
interviewed in each country. 
 
Dependent variable 
For the purposes of our analysis, we treat social cohesion as the (perception of) micro-level 
interactions between individuals and groups within their country. Such perceptions may be a 
better indicator of what shapes an individual’s behaviours and actions than objective 
measures, such as crime levels or education. Thus, we operationalise social cohesion as a low 
degree of perceived social tensions among key socio-economic groups, including the poor 
and the rich (wealth), managers and workers (social class), old and young people (age), and 
different racial and ethnic groups (ethnicity). Respondents to the Eurobarometer were asked 
to indicate whether they perceive tensions between each of those social groups in their 
country. More precisely they were asked: “In all countries there sometimes exists tension 
between social groups. In your opinion, how much tension is there between each of the 
following groups in (YOUR COUNTRY)?”. Answer possibilities ranged between ‘A lot of 
tensions’ (1), ‘Some tensions’ (2), and ‘No tensions’ (3). We assume, the lower the degree of 
tensions between indicated groups are, the higher the perceived social cohesiveness of a 
given country.  
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[Table 1 about here] 
 
 Consistent with prior research, we regard social cohesion as a latent concept (e.g. 
Andrews, Jilke and Van de Walle, 2014), and thus constructed a social cohesion index 
consisting out of all four mentioned foci. For the construction of the latent variable, we use 
confirmatory factor analysis (for an overview see Kline 2010) using the statistical software 
Mplus (version 6.12; see also Muthén and Muthén 2012, p. 62). A robust weighted least 
squares estimator was employed to deal with the ordered categorical nature of our factor 
indicators (see Muthén 1984; Muthén, du Toit and Spisic 1997; but see Kline 2011, pages 
180-181). In their simulation study, Flora and Curran (2004) point out the positive 
performance of the robust weighted least squares estimator when dealing with measurement 
models that come from ordinal factor indicators. Furthermore, a full information estimator 
was used to incorporate all items into the measurement model where there is at least one 
available data point for one of the four items (see also Little and Rubin 2002). Observations 
with missing data for all four items were deleted (148 respondents in total). 
Table 1 indicates that each measure of inter-group tensions loads on to a single latent 
trait of social cohesion. A Cronbach's alpha of 0.70 confirms the internal scale reliability of 
this social cohesion index. Figure 1 provides an overview of perceptions of social cohesion 
across European countries. We can see that there are clear cross-national differences. For 
example, in Denmark, Cyprus, Bulgaria and Portugal we find high levels of perceived social 
cohesion, while in the Czech Republic and Hungary they are very low. These variations are 
comparable to those for the “acceptance of diversity” indicator presented in Dragolov et al’s 
(2013) comprehensive international social cohesion rankings. Interestingly, like the 
“acceptance for diversity” ranking, our ranking diverges from other measures of social 
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cohesion, such as interpersonal trust, in some slightly unexpected ways, with, for example, 
Bulgaria and Portugal scoring highly, while France and Germany don’t do quite so well.  
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
Independent variables 
In order to assess citizens' evaluations of social services, respondents were asked to indicate 
their perceptions of service quality for a variety of key services, including long term care, 
child care, public employment, social housing, and social assistance. More precisely, 
respondents were asked "Thinking about the quality of ... in (OUR COUNTRY), would you 
say that it is very good, fairly good, fairly bad, or very bad?" This results in a four point 
likert scale measure of service quality for each service under consideration. We assume that 
the measures do not just reflect evaluations of specific services, but are more general 
evaluations about the quality of social services in a given country (see also Kumlin, 2009 for 
a similar approach). Hence we regard citizen perceptions of social service quality as a latent 
concept. Indeed, all items are highly correlated with each other and a Cronbach's alpha of 
0.85 exemplifies its high internal reliability. Thus, we used all five items to construct a 
measure of social service quality by extracting factor scores using factor analytical techniques 
by means of a weighted least squares estimator (the same method as for our dependent 
variable). To deal with item non responses, a full information estimator was employed. 
Observations with missing data for all four items were deleted (2,124 respondents in total) 
prior to the analysis. Similar results were observed when the sample was restricted solely to 
respondents with no prior experience of using any of the services in question (available on 
request). 
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[Table 2 about here] 
 
Given substantial cross-national disparities in income levels and the cost of living 
across Europe, it is important to utilize an indicator that represents the relative levels of 
experienced economic strain across the EU. As indicated by reference group theory, 
individuals generally judge their own economic situation by comparing their own conditions 
with that of relevant others (Runciman, 1966). In this regard, respondents to the 
Eurobarometer 74.1 were asked to indicate on a six point Likert scale how comfortable they 
felt against the background of their total household income. Specifically, they were asked: “A 
household may have different sources of income and more than one household member may 
contribute to it. Thinking of your household’s total monthly income, is your household able to 
make ends meet…?”. Answer possibilities ranged from ‘Very easy’ to ‘With great difficulty’. 
We used this specific item on individuals' self-perceived economic strain in our subsequent 
analysis. Measures of this type have been used in several prior studies (e.g. Andrews, Jilke 
and Van de Walle, 2014; Blekesaune, 2013).  
 
Control variables 
We control for a wide range of possible confounders that may have on influence on the 
relationships we study (see table 3). First, we control for respondents' wealth to parse-out the 
effects of economic strain from those simply associated with lower household resources, 
which are also anticipated to have a negative relationship with social cohesion. In this regard, 
respondents’ wealth status is measured by asking them to indicate on a 10 point Likert scale, 
ranging from very poor to very wealthy, where they would situate the economic situation of 
their household. In addition, we control for peoples' current employment status. Here, 
respondents were grouped into seven categories: managers and professionals, clerical 
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workers, self-employed, working class, unemployed and not in the labour force. Prior 
research highlights that the unemployed, especially, are less likely to feel part of society (e.g. 
Dieckhoff and Gash, 2015) and therefore more apt to experience “sour grapes”. 
Measures of age (continuous), gender and the type of community individuals are 
living in (rural town, small or medium town, large town) are also included in the statistical 
models. Older people and men tend to feel more socially included (Dieckhoff and Gash, 
2015), while individuals residing in urban areas may be more accepting of social diversity 
than rural residents (Gorodzeiski and Semyonov, 2009). Controlling for educational status, 
we grouped respondents according to their age when they left fulltime education. Those who 
indicated that they had no formal education or exited the educational system at the age of 15 
or younger were regarded as having completed basic or no formal education. Those between 
16 and 19 years were categorized as having finished secondary and those older than 20 as 
finished higher education. Respondents who were still studying were assigned to one of the 
three categories in correspondence with their age. Education is consistently associated with a 
range of positive social attitudes (e.g. Dieckhoff and Gash, 2015). Finally, whenever a 
respondent had a different nationality from the country where he/she currently lived in, we 
coded them as an immigrant. Theories of segmented assimilation suggest first-generation 
immigrants may have a particularly positive view of the society to which they have migrated 
(Zhou, 1997). 
At the country level we control for economic factors that may impact respondents’ 
perceptions of social tensions by including a measure of GDP per capita in 2010. This 
enables us to parse-out the net-effects of economic strain from those simply associated with a 
poor economic situation within the country as a whole. Furthermore, we account for the 
amount of welfare contributions by the state, which may influence levels of social capital 
(van Oorschot and Arts, 2005). Thus we included a measure of the total expenditure on social 
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protection in 2010 as a percentage of a country's GDP. Descriptive statistics for all the 
variables included in the statistical modelling are shown in Table 3. 
  
[Table 3 about here] 
 
We estimate hierarchical linear regression models, with individuals (level 1) being nested in 
countries (level 2). This approach not only allows us to take into account potential clustering 
effects between individuals from the same country, but also explicitly deals with unobserved 
heterogeneity between countries via random intercepts and random slopes (Steenbergen and 
Jones, 2002). Basically, we want to model variance at the individual and country-level so that 
we get: 
ijijjij XY   110          (1) 
where 
jj 000              (2). 
Here, ijY  is the individual level dependent variable for individual i (=1,...,N) nested in country 
j (=1,...,J) - in our case that would be citizens' perceptions of social cohesion. ijX1  is an 
individual-level covariate (such as perceptions of the quality of social services, or economic 
strain), ij  the individual-level residuals and j0  the country-level disturbance term. Such 
random intercepts as in equation (2), can not only be introduced for the regression intercept, 
but also for individual covariates so that we have varying country intercepts and slopes within 
a single model. 
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Results 
A series of two-level linear regression models were estimated to assess the independent and 
combined effects of social service quality and economic strain on citizens' perceptions of 
social cohesion. First, the null model was estimated to evaluate how much variation in 
respondents’ perceived social cohesion can be attributed to differences across countries, and 
whether multilevel modelling is actually needed (model 0). In a next model, we look at the 
individual effects of our control variables on perceptions of social cohesion using a random 
intercept model (model 1). We then estimate the linear effects of social service quality on 
social cohesion including all control variables (model 2). Conforming with our theoretical 
expectations we then included a squared term of service quality (model 3). Furthermore, to 
account for unobserved heterogeneity in country differences that may affect the relationship 
between service quality and social cohesion, we include random slopes for our measures of 
social service quality. In model four we add a measure of economic strain to our model. In 
our final model (model 5) an interaction term between service quality and economic strain is 
added to investigate the combined effect of both predictors on social cohesion. All continuous 
variables have been mean-centred before they were entered into the models; estimations have 
been executed using Stata 12.0 and its 'xtmixed' routine. 
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
Table 4 provides an overview of our results. The intercept only model displays an 
intraclass correlation of 0.12, which means that 12% of the total variation in peoples' 
perceptions of social cohesion can be attributed to country differences. Moreover, comparing 
our null model with a non-hierarchical linear model reveals a significant improvement in 
model fit (-2Log likelihood difference of 2,718, statistically significant at a 99% level). This 
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indicates that respondents are, indeed, not independent from each other, and that multilevel 
modelling techniques are needed for this kind of nested data structure.  
Model 1 displays the effects of our control variables. As anticipated, we find that 
individuals who are unemployed or not part of the labour force have more negative 
perceptions of social cohesion, than respondents who work as managers, or professionals. 
The same holds true for those people who are part of the working class and clerical workers; 
their views on social tensions are significantly more negative than the views of managers, or 
professionals – as previous research suggests is the case for attitudes towards immigration 
(Gorodzeiski and Semyonov, 2009). When considering immigrants, we can see that people 
who have not been born in their country of residence have significantly more positive 
perceptions of social cohesion, when compared to their native counterparts, which confirms 
the arguments made by theorists of segmented assimilation (Zhou, 1997). As for our other 
control variables, as expected, wealthier individuals perceived there to be less tensions 
between different social groups, as did older people, men and homeowners. Also, respondents 
living in large towns, compared to rural, or small or middle size places, have significantly 
more positive views of social cohesion, as do people with higher levels of education – both 
findings that accord with our theoretical expectations. When looking at the effects of our two 
country level controls, GDP and welfare spending, despite pointing in the anticipated effect 
direction, both measures do not turn statistically significant. All of which suggests that micro-
level determinants of social cohesion may be more important than macro-level determinants. 
Overall, the model displays acceptable fit values, with an R-squared of 0.02 and 0.07 
at the individual and country level respectively, as well as indicating an improvement in 
model fit over the null model in terms of the -2Log likelihood. In a next step, we add our 
linear measure of social service satisfaction to the equation, and allowed it to vary across 
country slopes (random slopes). It significantly improved our model fit compared to model 1. 
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The model shows that perceptions of social cohesion are, indeed, positively related with 
citizen satisfaction with social services. Following that, we included a squared term of social 
service satisfaction (model 3), which further improved the model fit. Moreover, model three 
confirms the hypothesised individual effects of service quality on social cohesion. When 
social services are regarded as of good quality, individuals have significantly more positive 
perceptions of social cohesion within their societies. However, the negative and statistically 
significant squared term indicates that there may be decreasing marginal effects of service 
quality on cohesion.  
To examine the decreasing marginal effect of social service quality on social cohesion 
in more detail, it is useful to estimate those marginal effects. In this regard, figure 2 displays 
the predicted values of social cohesion on different levels of service quality for all the 
countries, holding the model's covariates constant at their mean values. From the figure we 
can see that once service quality gets to be "good enough", a one unit improvement in quality 
has no further effect on perceptions of social cohesion.Thus, after a certain point, the better 
service quality gets, the less salient its positive relationship with social cohesion eventually 
becomes. Importantly though, the tipping-point for diminishing marginal returns to emerge 
lies at 1.64 on the social service satisfaction factor score, and less than two per cent of our 
sample (344 individuals) expressed such high satisfaction levels. All of which suggests that 
the provision of high-quality social services may be a remarkably reliable means for building 
social cohesion. 
 
[Figure 2 about here] 
 
In model four we add economic strain to our equation. Including random slopes for 
strain did not yield a significant change in model fit, thus we proceed without including them. 
20 
 
However, the inclusion of strain as such improved the model fit, and resulted in a R-squared 
of 0.04 and 0.09 at the individual and country level respectively. Regarding the effects of 
economic strain, we can conclude that it matters to individuals' perceptions of social 
cohesion. Experiencing economic hardship is negatively related with perceptions of social 
cohesion. The effect is statistically significant, and of a nontrivial magnitude. An individual 
who faces high levels of economic strain, perceives there to be on average 8% less social 
cohesion than someone who experiences no economic strain at all. 
 Turning to our final model (model 5), we examine the combined effects of economic 
strain and social service quality on social cohesion, investigating in particular whether strain 
weakens the positive association between social service quality and social cohesion. The 
inclusion of an interaction term between social service quality and economic strain did not 
lead to an improvement in model fit. Furthermore, the coefficient is only of weak magnitude 
and does not exhibit statistical significance, suggesting that the experience of economic strain 
does not influence the relationship between social services quality and social cohesion. These 
results can be further illustrated by figure three, where we depict the marginal effects of 
service quality on social cohesion, contingent on different levels of economic strain holding 
all other control variables constant at their mean values. The figure points in a similar 
direction: economic strain does not moderate the service quality-cohesion relationship. Thus 
we have to conclude that both predictors, perceptions of social services quality and economic 
strain, have substantive individual effects on perceptions of social cohesion, but not any 
combined effect. Or, put differently, that economic strain does not undermine the potential 
for social services quality to make a positive contribution to the cohesiveness of society.  
 
[Figure 3 about here] 
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Discussion  
The statistical results we present suggest that there is a positive relationship between social 
services quality and perceptions of social cohesion – though with some evidence of 
decreasing marginal effects at high quality levels. At the same time, perceptions of social 
cohesion are negatively associated with economic strain, even when controlling for other 
relevant personal characteristics and circumstances. Nevertheless, the largely positive effect 
of social service quality on social cohesion did not appear to be influenced by the experience 
of having difficulty making ends meet. For people satisfied with the social services that they 
receive, economic strain made it no more or less likely that they would perceive tensions 
between different social groups within their country.  
Our study builds on institutional theories of social capital providing a rare test of the 
connection between the quality of social services and inter-group tensions in European 
societies. Although prior studies have explored the importance of welfare expenditure and 
universal versus particularistic welfare policies for social cohesion, that research has tended 
to focus on interpersonal trust as a measure of cohesion (e.g. van Oorschot and Arts, 2005; 
Lee, 2013), rather than the relations between different social groups. Our analysis of the 
Eurobarometer 74.1 data provides qualified support for previous work drawing inspiration 
from institutional theories of social capital, highlighting that the quality of the welfare state 
can make an important positive contribution to societal cohesiveness within European 
countries – though this contribution may eventually exhibit diminishing marginal returns.  
The statistical results indicate that perceived economic hardship is associated with 
worsening social relations, thereby affirming the insights of reference group theory regarding 
the role that social comparison plays in shaping societal outcomes. Not only is the actual 
income of individuals an important micro-level determinant of perceptions of social cohesion, 
but their relative experience of economic strain too shapes the way in which they perceive 
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inter-group relations. That said, the findings do provide succour for supporters of social 
citizenship by illustrating that although economic strain is associated with increased social 
tensions, this is not sufficient to disrupt the positive contribution that social services can 
make to the cohesiveness of European societies.  
Although our study analyses a broad nationally representative sample of the adult 
population of 27 EU member countries, it has important limitations. First, we cannot 
confidently rule-out that there are other important respondent level factors that we may have 
been omitted from our empirical analyses.  Further analysis (available on request) revealed 
respondents’ life satisfaction and optimism towards life did not affect the results we present, 
but there are other personal attributes that may be relevant, such as altruism (Kearns et al., 
2014) and social dominance orientation (Pratto et al., 1994) that we cannot analyse on this 
occasion. Second, it could be argued that instead of social service quality and economic strain 
influencing perceptions of social cohesion, it could be the other way around. While we cannot 
test this alternative proposition with our data at hand, theoretically we derive the direction of 
causality from two well-established bodies of literature: a) institutional theories of social 
capital, and b) reference group theory, which clearly suggest that our predictors of interest 
directly affect perceptions of social cohesion, and not the other way around. Nevertheless, 
future studies are advised to employ more robust research designs such as time-series 
analytical techniques, or (quasi-)experimental designs, which can more effectively 
differentiate between cause and effect. In addition, subsequent research should seek to 
analyse multiple indicators of cohesion, distinguishing, in particular, between norms-based 
aspects of cohesiveness, such as community identification, and relational aspects, such as 
inter-group relations.   
With these methodological caveats in mind, we believe our study has important policy 
implications. Efforts to improve the quality (or performance) of social services may have 
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benefits beyond those immediately felt by recipients of the services themselves, making a 
vital contribution to social solidarity and the experience of citizenship within European 
societies. Interventions designed to drive service standards upwards within social care, child 
care, employment services, housing and may therefore achieve more than just the 
improvement of organizational functioning. This wider societal gain is something that merits 
much more extended consideration, and it would be fascinating to investigate which types of 
policies, initiatives and reforms result in the greatest positive pay-off for inter-group 
relations. Interestingly, it may be the case that those interventions likely to result in improved 
responsiveness and “customer satisfaction” are also the ones that have the greatest impact on 
social cohesion. In this respect, the ‘personalisation’ agenda and the development of a social 
investment state may, in the right circumstances, be an apt response to the crisis in European 
welfare states (Van Kersbergen and Hemerijk, 2012; Taylor-Gooby, 2011). At the same time, 
it is important to note that the benefits of social service quality for social cohesion may 
eventually evaporate, suggesting that it might also be possible to make some kind of 
judgement about the service standards (and hence investment) required to sustain a cohesive 
society. Further research that sought to identify the optimal levels of service and social 
investment would cast valuable light on this important issue.  
 
Conclusion 
This study has indicated that social services quality has an important role to play in 
enhancing perceptions of social cohesion amongst citizens across Europe. It also highlights 
that the relationship between social services quality and inter-group relations is not 
influenced by the experience of economic hardship. Ultimately, this implies that more should 
be done to understand and support the work that social service organizations can undertake to 
incorporate all social groups within the welfare state. Previous research suggests that for the 
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personalisation of social services, in particular, to work requires that diverse local actors 
responsible for its implementation work very closely together (Power, 2014) and that street-
level bureaucrats develop new skills and capabilities essential for improving the quality of 
their interactions with clients (Toerien et al., 2013). How, and in what ways these goals can 
be achieved against the backdrop of fiscal austerity in many countries remains a major 
challenge for policy-makers at all levels of government.  
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Table 1. Citizens’ perceptions of social cohesion 
  Mean SD Share (in %) Min Max Factor loading 
Social cohesion (factor score) 0.007 0.650  -1.236 1.517 - 
Wealth 1.835 0.668  1 3 1 
  A lot   31.88 0 1  
  Some   52.79 0 1  
  No    15.33 0 1  
Social-class 1.821 0.619  1 3 0.997 
  A lot   29.92 0 1  
  Some   58.43 0 1  
  No    11.65 0 1  
Age 2.163 0.657  1 3 0.819 
  A lot   14.31 0 1  
  Some   54.98 0 1  
  No    30.70 0 1  
Ethnicity 1.741 0.650  1 3 0.650 
  A lot   38.62 0 1  
  Some   49.91 0 1  
  No    11.47 0 1  
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Table 2. Perceptions of social service quality 
  Mean Share (in %) SD Min Max Factor loading 
Social service quality (factor score) -0.005  0.702 -.2.709 2.497 - 
Long term care 2.545  0.729 1 4 1 
  Very bad  9.35  0 1  
  Fairly bad  34.42  0 1  
  Fairly good  51.52  0 1  
  Very good  5.71  0 1  
Childcare 2.812  0.676 1 4 0.885 
  Very bad  4.05  0 1  
  Fairly bad  21.42  0 1  
  Fairly good  63.41  0 1  
  Very good  11.12  0 1  
Public employment 2.340  0.744 1 4 0.936 
  Very bad  11.85  0 1  
  Fairly bad  40.05  0 1  
  Fairly good  44.37  0 1  
  Very good  3.73  0 1  
Social housing 2.470  0.730 1 4 1.047 
  Very bad  9.75  0 1  
  Fairly bad  38.09  0 1  
  Fairly good  47.89  0 1  
  Very good  4.28  0 1  
Social assistance 2.557  0.711 1 4 1.087 
  Very bad  7.53  0 1  
  Fairly bad  34.72  0 1  
  Fairly good  52.48  0 1  
  Very good  5.28  0 1  
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics 
      
 
      
  Mean SD Share (in %) Min Max N 
Economic strain 3.289 1.301  1 6 22952 
Employment category            
  Manager and professional   9.65 0 1 22952 
  Clerical worker   18.19 0 1 22952 
  Self-employed   6.87 0 1 22952 
  Working class   13.07 0 1 22952 
  Unemployed   8.69 0 1 22952 
  Not in labour force   43.54 0 1 22952 
Immigrant   2.47 0 1 22952 
Wealth status 5.434 1.623  1 10 22952 
Male   45.20 0 1 22952 
Age 47.903 17.859  15 95 22952 
Place of residence            
  Rural town   36.14 0 1 22952 
  Small or middle sitze town   36.07 0 1 22952 
  Large town   27.80 0 1 22952 
Homeownerhsip   77.00 0 1 22952 
Level of education          
  Basic education   19.69 0 1 22952 
  Secondary education   47.11 0 1 22952 
  Higher education   33.20 0 1 22952 
      
 
      
GDP/cap. 31.165 20.593  6.335 103.574 27 
Welfare spending as % of GDP 25.209 5.548  33.771 17.581 27 
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Table 4. Two-level linear models of social cohesion 
  Model0 Model1 Model 2 Model2 Model3 Model4 
  
Intercept 
only Controls 
Service 
quality 
Service 
quality 
squared 
Strain Interaction 
Service quality     0.101** (0.011) 
0.101** 
(0.012) 
0.093** 
(0.012) 
0.093** 
(0.012) 
Service quality squared       -0.030** (0.006) 
-0.028** 
(0.006) 
-0.029** 
(0.006) 
Economic strain         -0.038** (0.004) 
-0.038** 
(0.004) 
Service quality X strain            -0.003 (0.005) 
              
Employment category (Ref.: Manager and professional)       
  Clerical worker   -0.044** (0.016) 
-0.045** 
(0.016) 
-0.045** 
(0.016) 
-0.043** 
(0.016) 
-0.043** 
(0.016) 
  Self-employed   -0.020 (0.020) 
-0.023 
(0.020) 
-0.022 
(0.020) 
-0.021 
(0.020) 
-0.020 
(0.020) 
  Working class   -0.062** (0.018) 
-0.066** 
(0.018) 
-0.066** 
(0.018) 
-0.060** 
(0.018) 
-0.060** 
(0.018) 
  Unemployed   -0.092** (0.020) 
-0.090** 
(0.020) 
-0.089** 
(0.020) 
-0.073** 
(0.020) 
-0.073** 
(0.020) 
  Not in labour force   -0.048** (0.015) 
-0.057** 
(0.015) 
-0.057** 
(0.015) 
-0.054** 
(0.015) 
-0.054** 
(0.015) 
Immigrant   0.111** (0.027) 
0.104** 
(0.027) 
0.104** 
(0.027) 
0.116** 
(0.027) 
0.112** 
(0.027) 
Wealth status   0.036** (0.003) 
0.028** 
(0.003) 
0.028** 
(0.003) 
0.013** 
(0.003) 
0.014** 
(0.003) 
Gender (Ref.: female)   0.052** (0.008) 
0.051** 
(0.008) 
0.051** 
(0.008) 
0.048** 
(0.008) 
0.048** 
(0.008) 
Age   0.002** (0.000) 
0.002** 
(0.000) 
0.002** 
(0.000) 
0.001** 
(0.000) 
0.001** 
(0.000) 
Place of residence (Ref.: Large town)           
  Rural town   -0.013 (0.011) 
-0.023* 
(0.011) 
-0.023* 
(0.011) 
-0.023* 
(0.010) 
-0.023* 
(0.010) 
  Small or middle size town   -0.025* (0.010) 
-0.031** 
(0.010) 
-0.032** 
(0.010) 
-0.031** 
(0.010) 
-0.031** 
(0.010) 
Homeownership   0.042** (0.010) 
0.037** 
(0.010) 
0.035** 
(0.010) 
0.028** 
(0.010) 
0.028** 
(0.010) 
Level of education (Ref.: higher education)         
  Basic education or less   -0.031* (0.013) 
-0.035** 
(0.013) 
-0.035** 
(0.013) 
-0.028** 
(0.013) 
-0.028** 
(0.013) 
  Secondary education   -0.035** (0.010) 
-0.034** 
(0.010) 
-0.033** 
(0.010) 
-0.029** 
(0.010) 
-0.029** 
(0.010) 
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Table 4 continued              
GDP per capita   0.002 (0.003) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
Social expenditure   0.000 (0.009) 
0.002 
(0.009) 
0.003 
(0.009) 
0.002 
(0.009) 
0.002 
(0.009) 
Constant 0.018 (0.043) 
0.040 
(0.045) 
0.054 
(0.044) 
0.066 
(0.045) 
0.065 
(0.044) 
0.065 
(0.044) 
              
Random Part             
Countries 0.222 (0.031) 
0.214 
(0.030) 
0.211 
(0.029) 
0.212 
(0.030) 
0.210 
(0.030) 
0.210 
(0.030) 
Individuals 0.608 (0.003) 
0.603 
(0.003) 
0.598 
(0.003) 
0.598 
(0.003) 
0.597 
(0.003) 
0.597 
(0.003) 
Service quality     0.047 (0.010) 
0.054 
(0.010) 
0.053 
(0.010) 
0.052 
(0.010) 
              
-2Log Likelihood 42,44 42,002 41,712 41,689 41,604 41,603 
Δ -2Log Likelihood - 438** 290** 23** 85** 1 
R-squared Level1 - 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
R-squared Level2 - 0.07 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.10 
              
Nindividuals 22,952 
Ncountry 27 
** p< 0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1;           
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Figure 2. Predicted values of social cohesion contingent on social service quality (95% 
confidence intervals).  
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Figure 3. Marginal effects of social service quality contingent on economic strain (95% 
confidence intervals).  
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